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Abstract: Due to a growing public awareness, in the last 40 years environmental impacts 
of development projects financed and supported by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have come into view. Since then, the member states have pressured 
both organizations to implement environmental concerns. We analyze the reactions of the 
World Bank and the IMF’s bureaucracies towards their principals’ demands. To reveal if, 
and to what extent, the observed reactions of both bureaucracies towards environmental 
integration can be assessed as organizational learning, we develop in a first step a heuristic 
model that allows for a distinction between different levels of learning (compliant and  
non-compliant, single-loop and double-loop). In a second step we describe the efforts of the 
bureaucracies of the World Bank (from the 1970s until today) and the IMF (from the 1990s 
until today) to integrate environmental protection into their activities. Due to our interest in 
the quality of the organizational changes, we finally analyze if and to what extent the 
bureaucracies’ reactions to the new external demand qualify as organizational learning. 
Furthermore, we discuss which factors helped or hindered organizational learning. 
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1. Introduction 
International organizations are important actors of global governance. This is especially true for the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since their foundation at the Bretton Woods 
conference in 1944, the spheres of competences of these international economic organizations have 
been growing. Thus, the World Bank and the IMF are today not only influential actors in the fields of 
economic development but also in adjoining policy fields, such as environmental policy. That the 
Word Bank and, to a lesser degree, the IMF are also responsible for the issue of environmental 
protection can be explained with the fact that their structural adjustment programs had—and often still 
have—severe consequences for the environment. For example, the World Bank was vehemently 
criticized by environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the 1980s for having financed 
projects in Latin America or Southeast Asia, e.g., in Brazil and Indonesia, that had disastrous effects 
on the environment [1–3]. The member states of the Bretton Woods institutions have reacted to the 
public pressure and requested the bureaucracies of both international organizations to address 
environmental issues more adequately. 
Subsequently, both international organizations have started to turn towards the issues of 
environmental protection. In our article, we will analyze if the reactions of the World Bank’s and the 
IMF’s bureaucracies to their principals’ demands qualify as organizational learning. An organizational 
learning approach allows us to analyze whether changes occur merely as compliance with external 
demands or as a result of internal organizational reflection triggered by external demands. Herewith, 
international organizations can be assessed as superficial or profound learners according to their 
responses to external demands that can range from pure obedience to conscious implementation. 
Further, we will ask which factors helped or hindered the organizational learning of international 
bureaucracies. Thus, we want to contribute to the research strand of organizational learning in two ways: 
(1) theoretically, we want to introduce a model of organizational learning that allows us to assess 
whether changes occur on a rather formal institutional level or if external demands to integrate 
environment requirements change international organizations’ guiding assumptions and beliefs. 
In our model, we distinguish between compliant and non-compliant learning and assume that 
organizations can learn even if they do not comply with an external demand. We argue that 
(international) organizations can deliberately decide to resist an external demand and pressure 
if an (international) organization is convinced that its present organizational beliefs are superior 
and should not be undermined and weakened. Furthermore, our theoretical framework of 
organizational learning allows us to assess whether organizational changes are a result of 
obedience or conviction;  
(2) empirically, we concentrate on international organizations and their bureaucracies, which most 
studies on organizational learning seem to have disregarded so far (see for exeptions, [4,5]). 
Thus, we open the organizational learning debate for international organizations which—despite 
sharing some similarities—differ in many ways from individual-based organizations as their 
members are both individuals in international bureaucracies and states as formal members 
according to international law [6]. This distinction allows us to show how organizational learning 
takes place within international organizations, namely at the level of international bureaucracies. 
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Our argument is divided into four parts. First, we lay the ground for our analysis by developing a 
model on organizational learning (Section 2). Therefore, we introduce international organizations as 
organizations from a sociological perspective, which serves as the conceptual basis for our theoretical 
framework. Then, we describe the environmental protection efforts of the World Bank’s bureaucracy 
from the 1970s until today (Section 3) and the efforts of the IMF’s bureaucracy from the 1990s until 
today (Section 4). The World Bank’s efforts to integrate environmental concerns into its activities can 
be divided into four periods whereas the activities of the IMF on environmental protection can be 
differentiated in three periods. We examine each period using our theoretical model and analyzing if 
and how the reactions of the World Bank and IMF qualify as organizational learning according to 
external demands to implement environmental concerns. Finally, we summarize our findings and shed 
some light on factors and conditions that hinder or foster learning in international organizations.  
2. Theoretical Framework—How to Study Organizational Learning? 
Organizations usually emphasize their capacities of knowledge management and learning to 
underpin their ability to react promptly and appropriately to changes in their surrounding 
environments. This is thoroughly studied when it comes to companies operating at the national and 
international level as well as national administrative organizations or schools [7–9]. The same is true 
for international organizations—e.g., the World Bank claims to be a knowledge bank and a learning 
organization [10]—however, they are neither prominent in organizational studies nor in organizational 
learning literature; except for the European Union and its institutions (see below). The gap, as Ness 
and Brechin ([11], p. 245) have stated, between “the study on international organizations and the 
sociology of organizations” is deep and persistent. Following Ness and Brechin, we first describe 
international organizations as organizations and, second, introduce a concept of organizational learning 
applicable to international organizations. Developing our concept of organizational learning, we pay 
attention to the evolutionary character of organizational learning by emphasizing linkage between 
organizational knowledge and organizational learning [12,13]. Thus, we can explain how international 
organizations can learn even if they do not implement external demands. 
2.1. International Organizations as Organizations 
Classical research on organizations and organizational learning typically argues from an  
open-system perspective that combines an inner-organizational view with the embeddedness of 
organizations in their environment [14,15]. In this view organizations are shaped, supported and 
infiltrated by their environment, which is the basic source for organizational survival because it 
consists of the necessary resources and elements the organization needs to exist. This includes the 
function of legitimization. In some theoretical approaches, the environment legitimates the 
organization; therefore, the organization has to adjust to environmental demands in order to survive [16]. 
The organization is not conceived as a monolithic entity, but it is seen as “a coalition of groups and 
interests, each attempting to obtain something from the collectivity by interacting with others” ([17], p. 36). 
Participants join and leave the organization or engage in ongoing exchanges with the organization 
depending on the bargain they can strike. From this perspective, organizations and their participants 
cannot be assumed to hold common goals or even to routinely seek the survival of the organization; 
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rather, organizations are systems of independent activities; “[s]ome of these activities are tightly 
connected; others are loosely coupled” ([14], p. 25).  
To fully appreciate these theoretical considerations, international organizations have to be 
conceptualized as organizations that differ in many ways from individual-based organizations 
concerning their inner-organizational structure and the relations with their environment [6]. Most 
obviously, the membership in international organizations is different from that in formal organizations 
like corporations or national administrations. In terms of formal definitions, states are the only 
members of international organizations and most studies tend to emphasize the role of member states [18]. 
Besides formal members, international organizations consist of secretariats and individuals in 
independent organs that are members, too. In particular, since the 1990s, empirical as well as theoretical 
studies in the realm of International Relations pay more attention to secretariats and international 
organization’s bureaucracies and examine how they exert influence on member states [19–21].  
The distinguishing character of bureaucracies and its members is their formally defined independence. 
Their loyalty does not belong to a state (although every administrative member is also a citizen of a 
member state) but to the rules and norms of their international organization. They are—contrary to 
states’ delegates or ambassadors—exclusively bound to their job description and not to an instruction 
of a political member. How bureaucracies can use their legal independency to generate authority and 
power has been analyzed by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore [20,22]. On a theoretical level, 
they focus on Weber and conceive international organizations as bureaucracies. Thus, the authors ask 
how international organizations gain authority and how they use their power [20]. Barnett and 
Finnemore highlight four different forms of an international organization’s authority (rational-legal, 
delegated, moral, and expertise) and they illustrate the usefulness of their concept by empirical studies 
of the IMF, the United Nations (UN), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. They 
argue that the power of international organizations derives from their authority, their knowledge, and 
the rules to regulate international relations, thereby constituting a global regulation structure [22]. 
Barnett and Finnemore identify three related mechanisms: “IOs (1) classify the world, creating 
categories of problems, actors, and action; (2) fix meanings in the social world; and (3) articulate and 
diffuse new norms and rules” ([20], p. 31). Barnett and Finnemore thus offer an innovative approach 
of a bureaucracy’s authority and they explain how international organizations as bureaucracies affect 
states and policy outputs.  
Whereas Barnett and Finnemore [20] conceptualize international organizations as bureaucracies, we 
perceive international bureaucracies as organizations within international organizations that are at 
least to a certain extent autonomous from member states due to their legal independency. Being 
interested in the learning of international bureaucracies with regard to external requirements, we will 
thus concentrate on the management and staff—the civil servants—of the World Bank and the IMF 
and their reactions to the member states’ demand to address environmental issues. Analyzing the 
World Bank and the IMF we are interested in the quality of the reactions of the bureaucracies. How do 
their bureaucracies implement external demands? Does the implementation qualify as organizational 
learning? If so, to what extent did the international bureaucracy learn?  
The open-system perspective and the organizational learning approaches build on the assumption 
that organizations need their environment for their survival for at least two reasons. First, it provides 
those elements the organization requires to produce any output and, second, it legitimizes international 
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organizations if they reinforce their environmental embeddedness ([14], pp. 77–80). The concept 
environment is somehow vague and unclear. Contrary to membership, belonging to the environment is 
not clearly defined and depends first and foremost on the observed (international) organization [14,23]. 
In general, the notion organizational environment means “everything outside the organization” ([24], p. 267), 
it is an “ocean of events surrounding the organization” ([25], p. 286). The border between an 
organization and its environment is marked by the organizational membership [26]. From the 
perspective of an organization, the environment contains plenty of information—more information 
than the organization can perceive and process. Therefore, organizations make choices and select 
certain aspects to which they respond [17,27], for example, the World Trade Organization is an 
important part of the World Bank’s environment but it is probably less important for the World 
Tourism Organization. Furthermore, the environment changes depending on international 
organizations preferences that can change, for example, since the 1990s the World Bank puts social 
policy issues onto its agenda, which were formerly covered by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO). Although the environment is difficult to assess ex-ante as it “includes every event in the world 
which has any effect on the activities or outcomes of the organization” ([17], p. 12), some potential 
actors can be identified that are usually relevant for international organizations. It can be assumed that 
states are part of the environment of international bureaucracies as they are holding particular 
expectations concerning an international organization/bureaucracy. Beside states and inner-state 
actors, other international organizations as well as national and international NGOs can be a 
meaningful part of the organizational environment. They can pose their demands and are (gradually) 
able to affect international organizations’ decisions, e.g., particular decisions of the IMF determine the 
range of potential decisions in the World Bank [28,29].  
The goal of organizations is to make their environment more predictable and thereby reduce 
equivocality and uncertainty for their members. Weick therefore emphasizes the process of organizing 
as “the resolving of equivocality in an enacted environment by means of interlocked behaviors 
embedded in conditionally related process” ([30], p. 91). This description of the organization-environment 
relations proves perfectly true for international organizations and their environment. It is the general 
task of international organizations to generate collectively binding decisions for member states. Thus, 
the environment of a member state becomes organized and ordered, international organizations 
“replace an ‘environmental order’ of some kind with an organizational order” ([6], p. 64). To fulfill 
this task, organizations are dependent on reciprocal interpretation and interaction with their 
environment. They collect data and interpret information in order to gain a better understanding, 
improve their organizational knowledge—with respect to future decisions and output—and ensure their 
survival within the environment [31,32]. “Organizational interpretation is formally defined as the process 
of translating events and developing shared understanding and conceptual schemes […]” ([32], p. 286). 
Organizations reflect their understanding of their environment in their decisions and thereby facilitate 
further decision-making for members. This is exactly what, for example, the World Bank does in 
alleviating poverty. It generates rules and conditions for financial lending and herewith it reduces 
equivocality and uncertainty among member states by creating rules that mirror expected behavior 
among member states [33]. Even if international organizations do not have the capacity to set binding 
rules for states, they do produce archetypical resolutions—like recommendations and declarations,  
for example, the ILO, International Atomic Energy Agency, or the World Health Organization.  
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These recommendations “are often treated by states as important as traditional sources of international 
law” ([34], p. 106) because they establish a legal ground to refer to, in particular in those realms such 
as health and employment, where there is little customary law ([34], pp. 103, 106).  
The sociological neo-institutionalism of the so-called Stanford School argues that organizations do 
not just exchange personnel and information but that they adopt their organizational structures to 
institutionalized elements in their environment. Therewith, they want to increase their legitimacy. 
“Organizations deal with their environment at their boundaries and imitate environmental elements in 
their structures” ([16], p. 347) and symbolize their embeddedness. Legitimacy has, in this respect, less 
legal but cultural implications. “Organizations that incorporate societally legitimated elements in their 
formal structure maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival capacities” ([16], p. 352). 
In this respect, organizations are forced to adapt to environmental institutions on a regular basis. 
However, regular adaption processes are difficult to realize as it hinders organizations to establish 
routines and standardized procedures in their working activities. In other words, a permanent adaption 
to environmental institutions to guarantee organizational legitimacy contradicts the establishment of 
routines and procedures, which are needed to stabilize decision-making processes.  
Therefore, neo-institutionalists argue that organizations establish a dual structure to buffer the 
organization. Referring to Thompson [35], two organizational levels can be differentiated: the formal 
structure and the actual working activities [16,35]. The level of actual working activities consists of the 
day-to-day working activities whereas the formal structures comprise “a blueprint for activities which 
concludes, first of all, the table of organizations” ([16], p. 342). This level can be understood as a 
representational level that reflects environmental institutions and institutionalized demands in order to 
be seen as a legitimate organization. Both levels are decoupled, which means that an adaption in the 
formal structure does not mean a change in the working activities. “To maintain ceremonial 
conformity, organizations that reflect institutional rules tend to buffer formal structures from the 
uncertainties of technical activities by becoming loosely coupled, building gaps between their formal 
structures and actual work activities” ([16], p. 341). Decoupling is needed to allow flexibility or 
adaption in the formal structures and stability and safety in the working activities simultaneously. 
“Thus, decoupling enables organizations to maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures 
while their activities vary in response to practical considerations” ([16], p. 357). Decoupling describes 
a flexible mechanism to adapt and implement environmental demands and institutionalized elements 
on a formal level whereas the day-to-day working activities remain untouched and unchanged. 
Herewith, decoupling provides organizational autonomy against external demands. 
How decoupling actually works can be illustrated by the example of the European Commission. 
Due to the Maastricht Treaty, the European Commission has to implement the so-called environmental 
integration principle into its policies. However, the implementation of the principle by different 
Directorates-General (DGs) of the European Commission was very heterogeneous. Whereas some 
DGs nearly fully implemented environmental issues into their policy proposals (e.g., in the field of 
energy policy), other DGs tried to keep environmental issues out of their policy realms, e.g., in 
industry and enterprise policy. Even though there have been structural changes in every DG, such as 
the establishment of environmental units, the actual working activities have not always changed 
accordingly. But over time even those departments with an economic rationale have changed their 
daily practices to comply with the external demand to integrate environmental concerns into their 
Adm. Sci. 2013, 3 172 
 
activities [36]. Thus, the study underpinned that learning of bureaucracies is possible and required to 
respond effectively to global problems such as environmental degradation and climate change. 
Learning bureaucracies are able to contribute to a productive governance that is likely to benefit the 
international community (cf., [37]).  
2.2. Introducing Organizational Learning 
Our analysis refers to the argument that organizational changes in international bureaucracies have 
an impact on policy-making in international organizations and thus on world politics [38,39]. We are 
interested in whether or not these changes occur purely on a structural level and have little, if any 
effects on the policy-making of international organizations, or if the organizational knowledge of 
international organizations and their bureaucracies has changed in a way that influences its policy-making. 
Both types of changes have been examined in different learning approaches that are rooted in political 
and social science, e.g., governance learning, policy learning, social learning, institutional change, 
organizational learning, etc. [40–45]. These approaches share the assumption that learning leads to 
change, but there is no conceptual clarity about how learning takes place and who learns what ([42], p. 1104). 
In a first step, we explain our concept of learning, which is based on organization studies. We then 
show how this approach can be distinguished from other well-established learning approaches.  
An open-system perspective emphasizes the embeddedness of organizations in their environment; 
the permanent interplay between the two is the basic mainspring for organizational learning. As the 
organizational environment is seen as complex, equivocal, unstable, and uncertain [25,46], 
organizations increase or modify their understanding of their environment by observing the results of 
their actions. According to Argyris (1976), organizational learning can be defined as “the detection and 
correction of errors, and error as any feature of knowledge or of knowing that makes action 
ineffective” ([47], p. 365). Thus, organizations have to observe their environment permanently to 
generate a match between environmental demands and organizational outputs [47]. However, learning 
does neither always increase the effectiveness of an organization nor does it lead to “veridical 
knowledge” ([48], p. 89). Organizations can learn even if they do not obey external demands and 
expectations and they can learn in a compliant manner what later turns out to be a mistake as it  
harmed the organization. Learning, therefore, is a cognitive process that can potentially change the 
behavior—“[a]n entity learns if, through its processing of information, the range of its potential 
behavior is changed” ([48], p. 89). But learning does not necessarily lead to observable changes in 
organizational behavior. Whereas the above is true for any entity—be it an individual or an 
organization—“an organization learns if any of its units acquire knowledge that it recognizes as 
potentially useful to the organization” ([48], p. 89). Thus, analyzing organizational learning of 
international organization bureaucracies has consequences for the international organization. 
The incentives for learning result from a perceived “misfit” between organizational expectations 
and the real environment organizations observe ([30]; [49], p. 91). However, this should not lead to the 
assumption that learning is merely a reaction to a problem, a stimulus that leads to response. 
Organizational learning can be anticipative to expected future challenges, too ([50], p. 25). In both 
cases organizational learning is triggered by a perceived gap between the organizational expectation 
and the observed environment. Thus, organizations must be able to change their underlying 
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assumptions and beliefs about adequate ways of interacting with a changing environment in order to 
survive. Specifically, this is done by learning new problem solutions, new strategies and designing 
better responses [41,46,51]. Organizational knowledge encompasses “that knowledge which is 
available to organizational decision makers and which is relevant to organizational activities (…) that 
can be used to determine organizational actions (at any level from tasks to strategy) with respect to a 
specific outcome” ([46], pp. 85–86). It has to be shared across the organization and contains the  
“inter-subjective shared constructions of reality” ([8], p. 16); it is an interpersonal and social process [48]. 
The inter-subjective quality of organizational knowledge presumes that knowledge—acquired by an 
organization’s member—must be communicable, consensual and integrated in order to be accepted, 
stored and applied within the organization and subsequently available for all organizational  
members [12,13]. It is a multilevel process that begins at the “individual level of analysis with 
cognition, affect, and behavior as key elements of individual’s intuiting” ([13], p. 457). Cognition, 
affect, and behavior are the core elements combined at the group level where the elemental content of 
individuals is combined during interpreting and integrating. Interaction and communication on the 
group level generates emergence of the phenomena that finally occurs as institutionalizing at the 
organizational level [13]. In this respect, organizational learning depends upon the permeability within 
organizations and between the organizational levels, thus communication between members within an 
organization is a precondition for sharing information and increasing organizational knowledge [52]. 
Thus, under-developed processes of communication within organizations are central problems for the 
field of organizational learning as insights from individuals do not automatically become the wisdom 
of a collective [53]. 
Organizational learning shows some similarities to governance, policy, and social learning. 
Governance learning takes place when existing steering modes improve or turn towards another  
mode ([51], p. 1127). Policy learning is associated with changes in policy outputs, e.g., new 
legislations, regulations, policy proposals [41,54]; whereas social learning also considers that new 
ideas and worldviews can trigger radical organizational shifts [40,55]. Similar to organizational 
learning, these approaches emphasize that organizations perform better when they gather information 
about their environment and change their behavior accordingly. Contrary to these learning approaches, 
organizational learning approaches do not focus primarily on outputs and changes, as these are the 
consequences of learning processes within organizations. Therefore, we rather concentrate on the 
organization itself and its organizational knowledge, i.e., on international bureaucracies within 
international organizations and their learning abilities. Even if approaches emphasize the 
organizational knowledge as the key feature to analyze learning and concentrate on international 
organizations’ bureaucracies, these approaches aim to design international organizations “to ensure 
that they are able to respond quickly and effectively” ([37], p. 256) to new challenges. Our aim is more 
modest as we are less interested in improving international organizations or whether they are good or 
bad learners. Rather, we focus on international organizations’ bureaucracies and advance the linkage 
between organizational knowledge and action in order to assess different modes of response according 
to external demands. Herewith, we can examine international organizations’ responses and can assess 
whether they follow external demands superficially or whether an international organization 
profoundly implemented external demands. However, we would not claim that organizational learning 
leads to a more effective or efficient behavior. 
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In order to study changes in organizational knowledge, Argyris and Schön ([15], p. 14) assume that 
all human actions in organizations are based on certain theories of action. These theories of action are 
related to organizational task knowledge that “may be variously represented as systems of beliefs that 
underlie action, as prototypes from which actions are derived, or as procedural prescriptions for 
action” ([56], p. 13). The theories of action can be divided into espoused theory and theory-in-use. 
Although rooted in another ontological frame, this differentiation resembles the distinction between 
the formal structure and the actual working activities [35]. The espoused theory represents the official 
organizational guidelines, strategies, and objectives that “people report as a basis for action” ([47], p. 367). 
It establishes the official frame in which organizational action occurs and generates a “corporate 
identity” within the organization and is reflected in organizational structures and procedures. The 
theory-in-use describes the actual behavior of organizational members and units, which is regularly 
tacit and undiscussable. The theory-in-use is “the theory of action which is implicit in the performance 
of that pattern of activity” ([56], p. 13); it is not constructed as a given, but from observations of action 
and interactions within organizations. Applying these theories, two types of organizational learning 
can be distinguished: single-loop learning and double-loop learning. Although there is neither a 
consistent or dominant theory of organizational learning [52], the differentiation between these types 
of learning gain acceptance and has just been perpetuated. Hedberg [27] makes a similar distinction 
and differentiates in “adjustment learning”, “turnover learning”, and “turnaround learning”. Fiol and 
Lyles [57] talk about “lower-level-learning” and “higher-level-learning”, and Hall [40] differentiates 
first order, second order, and third order change. 
Single-loop learning is triggered by a perceived mismatch between the consequences of an 
organizational action and its underlying expectations ([15], p. 19). The central mechanism of this 
learning process results from a feedback of information gained through environmental observation that 
functions as a stimuli for organizational adaptation. Objects affected by single-loop learning are rule 
catalogues that are reflected in work instructions, tasks and role descriptions; while features that are 
embedded in theory-in-use—like world views, beliefs, and other basic assumptions—remain 
unchanged ([15], p. 18). Single-loop learning, therefore, can be characterized as an activity that “does 
not question the fundamental design, goals, and activities” of an organization ([47], p. 367) and takes 
place on the espoused theory level. 
Double-loop learning is induced by the confrontation between the effectiveness and the efficiency 
of traditional organizational hypotheses, norms, and actions as well as procedural instructions, with 
perceptions from their environment. It results “in a change in the values of theory-in-use, as well as in 
its strategies and assumptions” ([56], p. 21). This type of learning challenges organizations because 
they have to question and modify their deeply rooted assumptions and core beliefs, which in turn may 
affect their identity ([58], pp. 131–133). Since organizations normally try to protect themselves against 
this, the acquisition of new knowledge normally depends on how it fits with their existing core beliefs. 
Double-loop learning, therefore, occurs on the theory-in-use level and then affects the espoused theory level. 
The concept of theories of action offers an elaborated tool to distinguish various types of 
organizational learning. The literature on organizational learning typically distinguishes between 
organizational learning and non-learning ([42], p. 1110). Here, we propose a second distinction, 
namely between compliant and non-compliant learning. Hence, we assume that organizational learning 
can take place when organizations do not comply with an external demand ([59], p. 1247). Whereas 
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compliant learning takes place when an organization changes its theories of action according to an 
environmental demand, non-compliant learning means that an organization does not obey an external 
demand. Instead, the organization develops strategies to underpin its non-conforming attitude and 
behavior, as it is convinced that its behavior and guiding assumptions are predominant and should 
remain untouched. In such cases, organizations state that complying with the demand would jeopardize 
the organization’s core convictions and destroy its identity. Conceptually, it would make sense to 
differentiate between non-compliant learning in a single- and double-loop learning manner. But it 
seems empirically unfeasible to assess whether an organization just ignores a demand (non-learning) 
or whether it enforces its existing activities on the espoused theory level without questioning its 
theory-in-use (non-compliant single-loop learning). Hence, we understand non-compliant learning 
always as a conscious questioning of an organization with its core beliefs and basic assumption 
(theory-in-use), i.e., non-compliant learning is per definition double-loop learning. In contrast to such a 
reflexive examination of its theories of action and a deliberate refusal of an external demand,  
non-learning takes place if an organization simply ignores the demand. In this regard, ignoring means 
either seeing the demand without consequences for the theory-in-use or simply not perceiving it as a 
demand for the organization. In this case the theories of action remain unchanged.  
In accordance with Egan [59], we argue that organizational learning can be decoupled from 
organizational change, i.e., organizational change does not need to be evident in order to identify 
learning and vice versa organizational learning does not necessarily lead to change. Organizations 
learn if, and only if, their knowledge alters, but this does not necessarily impact organizational 
behavior. This difference is relevant when compared to various learning models or an institutional 
change approach—even one of gradual transformation [45]—because these approaches assume that a 
policy or institutional change must be visible to qualify as learning. In contrast, we propose to shift the 
focus from policy and institutional changes to organizational knowledge in order to analyze learning. 
In this respect, we do not claim that organizational learning leads to any positive outcomes, but assume 
that organizational learning is a change of organizational knowledge that is not necessarily linked to 
functional or organizational improvements. 
Taken the above-mentioned differentiations into account, we can distinguish four levels of 
organizational learning. First, we differentiate between learning and non-learning. Learning can only 
take place if organizational knowledge alters which can be detected in changing theories of action. 
Second, we distinguish compliant and non-compliant learning concerning the external demand—be it 
an explicit or an anticipated demand. Third, compliant learning can be divided in single- and double-loop 
learning. Non-compliant learning, however, is a conscious scrutinizing of theories of action in which 
an organization decides not to follow an external demand because it is convinced of its theories of 
action. Fourth, we detect single- or double-loop learning by analyzing organizations’ theories of 
action. Changes on the level of theory-in-use that are accompanied by changes of the espoused theory 
signify double-loop learning. Double-loop learning is a cognitive process in which organizations 
question their core beliefs and underlying assumptions. Single-loop learning is characterized by sole 
changes on the level of espoused theory without further reflections of an organizations’ theory-in-use 
(see Table 1). Changes of the espoused theory can be detected from structural and procedural changes 
of international organizations. Compliant organizational learning is observable in organizational 
changes whereas the absence of organizational changes does not imply non-learning. In this case it has 
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to be scrutinized whether an organization learns in a non-compliant way (i.e., theories of action 
changed) or does not learn, e.g., when an organization ignores external demands without questioning 
its theories of action (non-learning). Even though non-compliant learning is difficult to determine it is 
a conceptual supplement to conventional organizational learning concepts. It unfolds how 
organizations might learn even if they do not follow external demands, e.g., when an organization 
internally disputes about an external demand and discusses whether it can and is willing to implement 
it or not and then opts for non-compliant behavior. In this case, we would identify non-compliant 
double-loop learning as the organization had questioned its core beliefs and underlying assumptions 
(theory-in-use) but decided not to change according to an external demand. It deliberately reinforces 
its existing theory-in-use that is seen to be superior. 
Table 1. Levels of Organizational Learning.  
Level Organizational Learning 
1 Non-learning Learning 
2  Non-compliant Compliant 
3  Double-loop Single-loop Double-loop 
4 
Theories of action 
remain unchanged 
Theory-in-use and 
espoused theory change 
Espoused theory 
changes whereas 
theory-in-action 
remains unchanged 
Theory-in-use and 
espoused theory change 
2.3. Methodological Remarks 
Based on our theoretical framework on organizational learning, we will present in the following 
sections our illustrative, multiple-case study on environmental integration within the Bretton Woods 
institutions (cf., [60], pp. 6–10). As described above, international organizations are not unitary actors 
but composed of intergovernmental bodies and an international bureaucracy. Hence, the requirements 
to address environmental issues can be defined as external demands for the administrations of the IMF and 
the World Bank, as these were requests of the intergovernmental bodies. However, organizational learning 
takes place even if just the administration acquires knowledge that leads to organizational learning.  
With the descriptive case studies ([60]; [61], p. 347; [62], p. 49), we want to show in how far the 
World Bank (Section 3) and the IMF (Section 4), have reacted to the external demand to take 
environmental protection into account and clarify if and in how far both administrations have learned 
in this respect. We focus on the World Bank and the IMF because both have some similarities and, as 
past experience has shown, these are two powerful international economic organizations whose  
(in-)activities have had a strong influence on the environment. Both institutions share, e.g., a common 
history of origin and follow closely related mandates. They pursue the goal of rising living standards in 
their 188 member states. While the World Bank’s special task is to promote long-term economic 
development and poverty reduction, the IMF’s mandate is to promote international monetary 
cooperation. Originally, the Bretton Woods institutions were not in charge of environmental 
protection. This has changed in recent decades. Due to the growing public interest in environmental 
protection combined with NGO-led campaigns against controversial projects supported by the World 
Bank and the IMF, both international organizations have been requested by their member states to 
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address environmental issues. As the World Bank and the IMF are dealing with the issue of 
environmental protection since the 1970s and the 1990s, both cases could shed light on the dynamic 
and complex process of organizational learning.  
The first case study on the World Bank covers the time period from the 1970s until today. It is 
based on both a comprehensive secondary literature on the Bank’s efforts to integrate environmental 
protection into its activities and an analysis of official documents published by the Bank (and the 
OED/IEG, see below) that report in a frank language on the Bank’s environmental performance. In 
addition, we used critical reports from environmental NGOs to bring in a different perspective on the 
World Bank’s efforts.  
While environmental protection is one of the World Bank’s tasks, the mandate of the IMF was not 
expanded by environmental protection ([63], p. 1). Even though the IMF member states decided that 
the Fund should take environmental aspects into account, too, this decision and the resulting process 
did not seem to have reached scholars’ attention. Thus, we have drawn on publications by the IMF and 
its staff. Especially the staffs’ publications [64,65] give instructive insights into the Funds’ reactions 
on the new external demands in the 1990s. To give an overview of its activities on the issue, we also 
consulted reports from environmental NGOs.  
We interpreted the published material to answer our research question if and in how far the 
administrations of the World Bank and the IMF have learned. The sections on the World Bank and the 
IMF will illustrate this step. As said above, several documents published by the Bank and the Fund 
were written in a frankly manner. Thus, they were helpful to also learn something about the 
administrations’ theories-in-use. Herewith, we want to illustrate our theoretical model and explain why 
it might be useful to focus on organizational learning of international organizations instead of 
organizational changes solely [61]. Furthermore, we are able to assess whether an international 
organization might have learned even if it does not change its behavior according to external demands 
(non-compliant learning). 
3. The World Bank 
The World Bank’s efforts to integrate the environment into its activities can be divided into four 
time periods. In the first period (1970–1986), the administration’s turn to environmental protection has 
started under Word Bank president Robert McNamara. In the second period (1987–1994), several 
structural and procedural changes were accomplished to improve the Bank’s environmental outcomes 
that proved rather ineffective. Thus, the Bank renewed its efforts to incorporate the environment under 
the presidency of James Wolfensohn and beyond (1995–2007). Finally (2008–2012), the example of 
the Bank’s more recent efforts to revise its safeguard policies shows that the Bank tries to take the 
issue of environmental protection more seriously into account. Before we will describe this 
development and show that the Bank’s reaction towards the external demands qualifies as single-loop 
learning in the first three phases, while there seem to be some indications of double-loop learning in 
the final time period (for an overview see Table 2), we will give a short overview of the Bank’s 
governance structure.  
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Table 2. Organizational Learning within the World Bank.  
Period 
Type of 
learning 
Changes in theories of action 
I 
1970–1986 
Single-loop 
learning 
Change of espoused theory  
- Structural change: establishment of environmental unit 
- Procedural change: voluntary environmental guidelines for project appraisals 
II 
1987–1994 
Single-loop 
learning 
Change of espoused theory  
 Official approach of doing no harm instead of business as usual 
- Structural changes: centralization of environmental department, increase of 
environmental staff 
- Procedural changes: environmental action plans, increased lending for 
environmentally beneficial projects, binding environmental safeguards  
III 
1995–2007 
Single-loop 
learning 
Change of espoused theory  
 Official approach of promoting the good instead of doing no harm 
- Structural changes: increase of qualified environmental staff, nomination of 
environmental project managers, establishment of a quality and assurance 
compliance unit  
- Procedural changes: requirement to take environmental concerns into account 
in all Bank activities, official strengthening of internal monitoring and 
evaluation procedures (e.g., inspection panel) 
IV 
2008–2012 
Double-loop 
learning 
Change of espoused theory 
- Procedural change: review of the Bank’s safeguard policies  
Change of theory-in-use 
- Cognitive change: Administration broadly supports objectives of safeguard 
policies and acknowledges that not only its own expertise but also knowledge 
and expectations of diverse groups of stakeholders and shareholders is essential 
to improve safeguard policies and designs consultation process accordingly 
3.1. The World Bank’s Governance Structure  
The World Bank (officially the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)) is 
part of the World Bank Group. In addition to the IBRD, the World Bank Group is composed of the 
International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 
The member states of the World Bank are represented on the board of governors and the executive 
board. The board of governors, the plenary organ of the World Bank, is composed of representatives of 
all member states. The member governments delegated decision-making authority for all decisions 
over operations and policies to the Bank’s board of executive directors. The executive board consists 
of the president and 25 executive directors acting as a unit. It oversees the Bank’s business, including 
the approval of loans and the supervision of financial decisions. The president of the World Bank, who 
is responsible for the overall management of the Bank, chairs the meetings of the executive board 
whose decisions are prepared by the secretariat ([66], p. 228). Within the secretariat, the sustainable 
development network is today responsible for the environmental sector and for incorporating the 
concept of sustainability into the Bank’s activities. 
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3.2. The Bank’s Turn to the Environment (1970 until 1986)  
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the World Bank has been dealing with the external demand to 
integrate environmental aspects into its activities. Because the Bank has turned to environment 
protection early on, it was initially regarded as a leading international organization ([67], p. 539). 
However, the administration’s activities of the first time period just qualify as single-loop learning. We 
will illustrate this in the following.  
In line with our theoretical remarks on single-loop learning, the Bank’s president Robert McNamara 
(1968–1981) was prompted by the then forthcoming UN Conference on the Human Environment 
(1972) to think about what the Bank should do on the issue of environmental protection. Thus, in 1970, 
McNamara set up a new unit—originally responsible for environmental and health affairs—and established 
the post of an environmental adviser to guide the Bank’s environmental work ([68], p. 72; [69], p. 17). In 
parallel, the World Bank had begun to develop what is now called “safeguard policies” [70]: in 1971, 
the Bank required that the impact on the environment had to be considered in its project appraisals. 
However, no specific mechanisms were stipulated [70]. In 1975, the Bank’s secretariat issued 
voluntary guidelines on environmental developments of projects, but these non-binding 
recommendations were often ignored ([66], p. 230). In 1984, the Bank issued the operational manual 
statement on environment aspects of World Bank work outlining the Bank’s policies and procedures 
that could have environmental impacts. Later on, the Bank admitted that a clear definition of the term 
“environment” was lacking ([71], p. 2). In addition, the Bank did not make clear how much weight 
should be given to this particular aspect relative to all the others ([2], p. 429). Thus, only the Bank’s 
espoused theory had changed, while its theory-in-use had remained intact. Accordingly, a consistent 
environmental strategy was lacking ([67], p. 539) and the Bank incorporated environmental issues 
primarily “rhetorical” into its policy decisions” ([1], p. 253).  
Until the first environment-related reforms of 1987, the Bank’s secretariat had a huge influence of 
the granting of projects that was running in two phases ([66], p. 228). In the first phase, the secretariat 
prepared the projects. In the second phase, the executive board decided on financing. It was expected 
that the delegation of project planning and reporting evaluation to the secretariat would result in 
economically and technically sound drafts uninfluenced by political considerations. Even though 
projects came only into effect with the approval of the executive board that could veto the secretariat’s 
proposals, the decision-making process was mainly formed by the secretariat that did not challenge its 
core beliefs with regard to environmental protection requirements ([66], p. 228). 
This seems to be true also for the Bank’s decision-making level. Thus, the environment office was 
under-resourced and powerless ([72], p. 17). Until 1983, the environment office had only three 
environmental specialists on staff which were integrated into the project-approval process of the World 
Bank at a later stage, which, however, merely made environmental recommendations ([66], p. 230). 
Due to the limited resources, the environmental staff could “neither monitor nor enforce compliance 
with the organization’s environmental guidelines” ([1], p. 253). Furthermore, the executive board was 
unable to evaluate and control the Bank’s projects regarding environmental requirements due to 
lacking human resources and expertise ([66], p. 230).  
During this period, the Bank’s secretariat even tried to resist the environmental initiatives of its 
president. In these early years the administration was acting independent from the Bank’s member 
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states ([1], p. 242). The donor countries were of the perception that the World Bank performed its tasks 
and was not engaged in activities that fundamentally conflicted with their interests ([1], p. 253). Thus, 
the Bank’s secretariat was left to its own devices and able to hold the environmental issue at arm’s length. 
As the World Bank did not really challenge its attitude concerning the requirements of 
environmental protection and its operational practices thus had not really changed, the criticism on the 
Bank’s projects did not stop. In the early 1980s, the World Bank was blamed for having financed 
projects that led to environmental disasters in Brazil and Indonesia ([1], p. 241). Environmental NGOs 
protested against the World Bank’s methods and demanded a change in lending practices.  
Because direct appeals to the Bank failed, critics called on member state’s governments—especially 
the USA—to put pressure on the World Bank. Thereupon, in 1986, the USA rejected a project due to 
environmental reasons and threatened not to accept the planned capital increase of the Bank unless it 
modified its behavior ([66], p. 231). 
3.3. The Bank’s Environmental Reform of 1987 and Its Meager Results  
In view of the criticism of some of the member states and of environmental NGOs concerning 
“World Bank-financed ecological disasters in Brazil, India, and Indonesia” ([73], p. 306), the new 
president of the World Bank, Barber Conable (1986–1991), admitted in 1987 that the Bank “had been 
a ‘part of the problem in the past’” and announced environmental reforms ([73], p. 306). Thus, the 
Bank increased its environmental staff and established a central environment department. Further, it 
announced new environmental policies and launched environmental action plans to review and address 
environmental problems in the most vulnerable developing countries. Also, the Bank increased lending 
for environmentally beneficial projects ([73], p. 306; [74], p. 103). At that time, tropical deforestation 
was the most urgent crisis in the developing world. Hence, Conable committed the Bank to drastically 
increase its forestry lending ([73], p. 309). Furthermore, Conable championed an independent study 
that, in 1992, “confirmed earlier criticisms” ([3], p. 30). 
In addition, binding environmental safeguards were introduced in 1987 to provide guidance for staff 
in identifying and preparing projects and to promote sustainable development in client countries ([75], p. 22); 
see for the establishment of the Bank's safeguard policy [76]). The safeguard policies were put in place 
“to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts of its projects on people and the environment” ([77], p. xiii). 
Thus, decisions on granting projects were bound to obligatory environmental guidelines defining a 
minimum standard of protection for projects financed by the World Bank. Therewith, also 
environmental impact assessments of projects became mandatory ([66], p. 234, 247; [74], pp. 112–115). 
Thus, the Bank’s official approach shifted from “business as usual” to “do no harm” ([67], p. 539).  
However, the adoption of the safeguard policies did not prevent the Bank’s involvement in 
“environmentally controversial projects” ([74], p. 102, see also [76], pp. 64–76). The staff praised the 
safeguard policies “as a milestone in the World Bank’s ‘environmental turnaround’”, but realized that 
“more needs to be done to reinforce borrower compliance” ([74], p. 113). Similarly, the Bank’s 
Operations Evaluation Department (OED), an independent unit within the Bank that reports directly to 
the executive board, detected that safeguard procedures “were not always implemented wholeheartedly 
by the World Bank project staff” ([74], p. 113). The OED was established in 1973, in 2006 it was 
renamed Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) ([74], p. 127). 
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In this time period, from the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s, the Bank’s bureaucracy learned from 
its errors of the past and thus introduced several environmental reforms. Therewith, the official 
approach shifted from business as usual to do no harm. However, only the espoused theory changed 
and we can, again, observe single-loop learning: the reform announced by the Bank president did not 
alter the daily practices of the administration. Thus, the independent OED had to notice that the 
environmental safeguards were not implemented wholeheartedly by the staff. This illustrates that the 
theory-in-use of the administration remained unchanged. That the administration complied only partly 
with the environmental demands posed by the member states can be explained with its “independent 
culture and agendas for action” ([22], p. 705).  
Even though the environmental reform of 1987 can be regarded as a small step in the right 
direction, it neither satisfied environmental NGOs nor the executive board ([1], p. 260). According to 
Nielson and Tierney ([1], p. 259), it “failed to alter core Bank practice”. Likewise, Rich ([73], p. 308) 
observes a “green rhetoric that hides a reality that is largely unchanged.” This can be exemplified with 
the Bank’s failed tropical forestry action plan that “appeared mainly to be a plan to promote 
traditional, export-oriented timber industry investment camouflaged by small components for 
environmental purposes ([73], p. 310). Further, the announced involvement of NGOs was not 
effectively put in practice ([73], p. 324). 
According to Rich ([73], p. 317), there were several institutional considerations that prevented the 
Bank from implementing the reforms in a meaningful way. For example, the Bank’s environmental 
effectiveness had been undermined by the senior management that at several occasions overruled the 
demands of the environmental staff. Furthermore, qualified personnel to conduct the environmental 
assessments was lacking, and the environmental department was not effectively integrated into the 
administrative level of the Bank ([1], p. 260). In addition to these internal constraints, also the 
borrowing countries from the developing world like Brazil, India, and Indonesia, and their executive 
directors opposed the Bank’s attempt to incorporate greater environmental conditionality ([73], p. 320). 
3.4. Renewed Efforts to Incorporate the Environment under Wolfensohn’s Presidency and beyond 
(1995–2007)  
Also in the third time period (1995–2007), only the Bank’s espoused theory had changed; thus, 
single-loop learning is at hand. The Bank’s official approach changed from do no harm to promoting 
the good, and the bureaucracy of the Bank strengthened its efforts on environmental integration. 
President Wolfensohn (1995–2005) reacted to the external criticism and started to hire qualified 
environmental staff. Most importantly, also the internal monitoring and evaluation procedures were 
strengthened to better control the secretariat and to ensure compliance with the environmental 
safeguard policies. While the Bank under Wolfensohn’s leadership had announced that the integration 
of the environment is essential to reach the Bank’s development goals, the administration regarded this 
official reorientation towards environmental protection as merely a rhetorical policy statement. The 
staff’s reluctant behavior towards environmental requirements illustrates that the theory-in-use did not 
change. In the following, we will describe this process in further detail. 
Already since the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992, the World Bank has strengthened its commitment to the environment ([78], p. 1). In the  
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mid-1990s, the Bank’s executive board decided to incorporate the environment into the Bank’s 
sectoral programs (e.g., transport), and the Bank’s bureaucracy was required to “ensure that all Bank 
activities take environmental concerns into account” ([78], p. 6). The Bank emphasized that at the 
beginning of the 1990s its “do no harm” approach of the 1980s has turned into a “proactive agenda 
aimed at ‘promoting good’ today” ([78], p. 22). Consequently, the number of staff was increased and 
the type of staff hired by the Bank changed in so far as more environmental economists and engineers 
as well as biologists were employed. Hence, the executive board could be more certain that the Bank 
staff had the ability to analyze environmental impacts of projects ([1], p. 263). 
Further, the Bank reacted to the broad and continuous criticism of its activities by improving the 
monitoring and evaluation procedures ([1], p. 260; [75], p. 13). Most of all, the secretariat’s autonomy 
was seen as problematic ([74], p. 118). To better control the secretariat, the executive board 
established an independent inspection panel in 1993 to hear complaints from groups that were directly 
affected by World Bank projects ([66], pp. 233–237). External actors may use the inspection procedure 
to verify whether a project is in consistency with the binding safeguards of the Bank ([66], p. 235). 
The inspection panel has a further effect: Because external actors bring “outside information to the 
inspection panel and thus the executive board […], board members found it much easier to get 
information about the likely impacts of Bank projects before the projects were implemented” ([1], p. 263). 
Like the binding environmental safeguards, the inspection panel was initiated to restrain the 
secretariat’s room for maneuver ([66], p. 233) and welcomed by scholars [79].  
In addition, it was decided in 1994 that each project with a potential environmental impact was 
assigned an environmental project manager who assessed the environmental impact and had to send an 
evaluation report to the executive board ([1], p. 264). In 1997, the Bank regrouped ten operational 
policies as specific safeguard policies (six environmental, two social, and two legal policies) and put in 
place administrative procedures to support compliance with the safeguard policies ([71], p. 3). To 
provide “additional oversight of safeguards quality in Bank projects”, the Bank created a separate 
quality and assurance compliance unit in 1999 ([77], p. xiv). However, a report of several NGOs ([80], p. 1) 
showed that the Bank’s environmental, health and safety guidelines for mining “in some cases […] do 
not even meet the mining industry’s ‘best practices’ standards.” 
Besides this restructuring, the Wolfensohn presidency was shaped by a rationalization that has 
indirectly weakened the implementation of environmental objectives. In 1996, decision powers were 
transferred to country directors. As a result, environmental safeguards “have been applied with varying 
vigor across World Bank operations”, and it depended on regional teams in the borrowing countries in 
how far the environmental impacts of Bank projects were monitored ([74], p. 126; cf., [67], p. 540). 
Not all staff members insisted on strict compliance with the safeguard policies; according to an investigation 
of the inspection panel some regarded them simply as “idealized policy statements” ([81], p. 23).  
Also the Bank’s evaluation department complained that environmental protection was not fully 
institutionalized at the whole administration and detected several institutional problems with the 
integration of environmental concerns. Therefore, the OED required serious institutional changes from 
the administration that actually poured into the first environmental strategy of the World Bank 
published in 2001 [82]. Consequently, the environmental strategy addressed some significant problems 
the Bank had had with environmental mainstreaming. Central to this environmental strategy is “the 
understanding that if we want development to succeed environment cannot be afterthought” ([75], p. 7). 
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First of all, the strategy paper criticized that the environment had only been “the concern of a small, 
specialized group” ([75], p. 3). In this context, it was queried that Bank professionals often saw 
environmental issues as a “self-standing agenda and not as an element of their core tasks of supporting 
development and poverty reduction” ([75], p. 311). The safeguard system was seen as an essential tool 
for integrating environmental concerns into development policies, programs, and projects. Therefore, it 
was planned to improve the quality and consistency of the application of safeguard policies ([75], p. 25). 
To enhance its record on environmental integration, some further institutional changes were seen as 
essential, like establishing clear lines of responsibility and incentives throughout the organization. In 
this context, the training of environmental as well as non-environmental staff had been announced and 
“green awards” were promised as incentives for non-environmental specialists in order to mainstream 
environment into their operations. In addition, the Bank’s incentive system rewarded outputs—the 
preparation and approval of investment projects—while the supervision and evaluation of projects 
were disregarded ([74], p. 126).  
Even though president Wolfensohn was identified as a “trigger for positives changes” ([74], p. 129) 
and also Greenpeace [83] admitted that the World Bank under Wolfensohn’s leadership has started “to 
understand environmental issues” the Bank’s activities under Wolfensohn’s leadership were criticized 
by environmental NGOs. For example, Greenpeace [83] regretted that “[t]here is a huge gap between 
the rhetoric and goodwill of current World Bank President James Wolfensohn, and the organisation’s 
Board of Governors where the real power lies with the donor countries’ finance ministers.” In addition, 
the WWF [84] in 2004 noticed “that oil and coal projects funded by the Bank were not contributing to 
the institution’s mission of poverty alleviation but were, in fact, creating more environmental, social 
and economic problems for the countries they are supposed to benefit.” The Bank’s focus on fossil fuel 
projects was also criticized by Friends of the Earth in 2006 [85].  
Although a number of reforms to green the Bank had been implemented [85], also the Bank’s 
internal evaluation showed that environmental mainstreaming in the World Bank was rather 
disappointing. Thus, the evaluation department was skeptical on environmental integration at the 
beginning of the 2000s and reiterated its criticism that environmental concerns were not integrated into 
the Bank’s core objectives and country strategies ([67], p. 542). According to the internal evaluation 
reports, the slow rate of environmental mainstreaming can be explained with the fact that the Bank’s 
staff did not prioritize environmental sustainability and continued “not to see environmental as integral 
to their operations” ([67], p. 543). In a similar vein, Weaver argues that while the World Bank was 
active in trying to “green” its image, changes in the “real operational practices of the Bank” were less 
visible ([86], p. 504), and also Nielson et al. [87] notice that “[c]hanging core values and beliefs about 
the importance of environmental […] outcomes has been slow.” However, even if the observed 
changes were rather minor and the staffs’ views concerning environmental protection did not seem to 
have changed, we argue that the Bank’s efforts at least meet the requirements of single-loop learning. 
3.5. The Safeguard Policies as the Bank’s Cornerstone to Protect the Environment (2008–2012)  
Still today, the evaluations of the World Bank’s activities on the issues of environmental protection 
are rather mixed. Even though some environmental NGOs and Bank’s shareholders point to several 
positive developments (e.g., the Bank’s improved engagement concerning the integration of 
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environmental aspects into large infrastructure projects [88], its work on the issue of climate change 
and climate change adaptation in least developed countries [89–91]), the Bank gets criticized for not 
meeting all environmental requirements and even for doing severe harm to the environment.  
For example, the WWF [92] in 2012 criticized the Bank’s financing for fossil fuels, the “single biggest 
source of CO2 emissions” and Friends of the Earth even argues that the World Bank as  
“a carbon-intense lender and promoter of deforestation […] has far more experience causing climate 
change than preventing it” ([93], p. 12). In a similar vein, scholars point out that the Bank’s overall 
environmental record is mixed ([74], p. 131) and that its “sustainable development identity is neither 
fixed nor stable” ([76], p. 58). 
Nevertheless, we argue that the example of the Bank’s safeguard policies—that officially have 
become “the cornerstone of the Bank’s efforts to protect people and environment” ([71], p. 2)—shows 
that there is at least some evidence of double-loop learning within the World Bank. In this case, the 
changed attitude of the Bank’s bureaucracy towards the safeguard policies and its renewed and 
strengthened activities on the issue—induced by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG, see 
above)—seem to qualify as double-loop learning. In the following, we will shed some light on this 
more recent development that could be decisive for the Bank’s future environmental performance. 
In 2008, the environmental performance of the World Bank from 1990–2007 was evaluated by the 
IEG. On the one hand, the evaluation group noted that the Bank “has made progress since 1990 as an 
advocate for the environment” ([94], p. 1). On the other hand, the IEG remarked that the Bank had not 
been able to integrate environmental stewardship sufficiently into its operations ([95], p. iii). 
Consequently, the IEG demanded that “environmental sustainability must become a core part of the 
World Bank Group’s strategic directions” ([95], p. iii).  
Beside the “lukewarm interest” from the Bank’s borrowing countries ([95], p. iii), the IEG pointed 
to several internal constraints that prevented an effective environmental mainstreaming. Regarding 
investment projects, it was criticized that the Bank “lacks an aggregate monitoring and reporting 
system that would allow it to more systematically assess the environmental aspects and results of the 
projects it supports” ([95], p. 5). Therefore, the IEG required the Bank to better monitor environmental 
outcomes and to assess impacts. In addition, the IEG deplored that competing priorities, insufficient 
staff skills, and an suboptimal use of budgets limited the Bank’s environmental performance ([95], p. 1, 7). 
The management of the World Bank mostly agreed with the recommendations of the IEG ([96], p. 36).  
In 2010, the IEG presented an evaluation on the safeguards and the sustainability policies covering 
the period from 1999 until 2008. The IEG, whose monitoring activities are acknowledged by several 
environmental NGOs, found that the quality of preparation and appraisal was to be 85 percent 
satisfactory in Bank projects and admitted that the Bank’s administration broadly supported the 
objectives of the safeguard policies ([77], p. xv). Also NGOs rated the environmental performance of 
the World Bank better than in the 1990s ([77], p. xv). However, the IEG deplored that more than a 
third of Bank projects had inadequate environmental supervision and criticized the “poor or absent 
monitoring and evaluation” ([77], p. xvii). A reason for this was that “too often, safeguard activities 
are considered an add-on, and left to environmental and social specialists who are underresourced and 
not well integrated into supervision teams” ([77], p. 31). Also the country directors expressed their 
concerns about the safeguards and criticized that “safeguards compliance is the responsibility of the 
client and it is the responsibility of the team to supervise compliance” ([77], p. 53). To manage these 
Adm. Sci. 2013, 3 185 
 
problems, the IEG advised the Bank, among others, to assign responsibility and budget for safeguards 
oversights and to include performance indicators on environmental outcomes ([77], p. xxii). 
In 2011, the IEG welcomed the Bank management’s commitment to update and consolidate its 
environmental policies on the basis of the IEG’s evaluation of 2010 ([97], p. 23). The administration 
regarded the review and update of the safeguard policies as an opportunity to deliver better 
environmental outcomes in the projects and programs which the Bank supports. Thus, the 
improvement of monitoring and supervision as well as a greater clarity on the responsibilities of the 
Bank and its clients were seen as vital ([71], p. 1, 8). Also the responsible committee of the Bank’s 
board of executive directors endorsed the update of the safeguard policies ([97], p. 23).  
The review process of the safeguard policies is based on a complex two-year consultation process 
that started in 2012 ([71], p. 14). By consultation, the administration seeks the views and input of its 
internal and external stakeholders and its shareholders so that the implementation of a new integrated 
framework will benefit from diverse perspectives. It had been recognized that the experience of its 
administration in applying and implementing the safeguard policies as well as the views of as wide and 
diverse groups of stakeholders (civil society organizations, research institutions, UN agencies, 
representatives of communities affected by Bank operations, etc.) as well as the knowledge and 
expectations of its shareholder governments are essential to improve the design and implementation of 
the current safeguard policies and to move to an integrated framework ([71], p. 12). Finally, the 
perception that the safeguard policies are “vitally important in avoiding, mitigating, or managing risks 
and impacts from operations” has poured into the World Bank’s environment strategy from 2012 until 
2022 ([98], p. 2). 
This recent development concerning the improvement of the safeguard policies seems to indicate 
that the World Bank’s administration, especially the management, has acknowledged the relevance of 
an effective safeguard policy system. The involvement of stakeholders, especially of environmental 
NGOs, and shareholder into the consultation process seems to show that the administration is willing 
to take also critical external positions into account. This seems to be indicative of a change of attitude 
of the Bank’s administration towards the relevance of environmental protection. However, this is a 
first interpretation of the World Bank’s recently published documents. Further empirical research, 
especially interviews with the Bank’s staff and environmental NGOs that—like Greenpeace [99]—, 
take a critical look at the Bank’s safeguard policies, could shed some more light on the ongoing consultation 
process and show if the administration’s core beliefs concerning environmental protection change and if 
the possible decline of the Bank’s safeguard policy norm—feared by Park in 2010 ([76], p. 202)—could 
have been prevented. 
4. The IMF 
The activities of the IMF on the issue of environmental protection can be divided into three periods. 
The IMF’s turn to the environment has started at the beginning of the 1990s, after its executive board 
had decided that the Fund should pay greater attention to environmental issues ([65], p. 3). In the first 
period (1990–1995), the IMF staff began to turn to the environment and to realize that environmental 
degradation can threaten economic growth. During the second period (1996–2000), the IMF tried to 
continue addressing environmental issues within its policy dialogues. However, the negative effects of 
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the Fund’s policies on the environment were increasingly criticized by NGOs. Finally, global warming 
prompted the IMF to enhance its activities with regard to the issue of climate change (2001–2012). 
However, the results of the IMF’s bureaucracy in terms of organizational learning have been rather 
modest to date; only single-loop learning is observable over the whole time frame (for an overview see 
Table 3). The theory-in-use of the administration does not seem to have changed as the fact that the 
IMF is only in favor of environmental protection measures provided that this furthers its own policies 
goals shows. Before we will describe the environmental integration within the IMF in detail, we will 
give a short overview of its governance structure. 
Table 3. Organizational Learning Within the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Period 
Type of 
learning 
Changes in theories of action 
I 
1990–1995 
Single-loop 
learning 
Espoused theory changed 
 Official approach of high-quality growth 
- Structural changes: none 
- Procedural changes: starting to consider environmental aspects in its policy 
dialogue and incorporating environmental measures in some of its stabilization and 
adjustment programs (looking for win-win situations) 
II 
1996–2000 
Single-loop 
learning 
Espoused theory changed 
 Official approach of high-quality growth 
- Structural changes: none 
- Procedural changes: continuing its efforts of first time period 
III 
2001–2012 
Single-loop 
learning 
Espoused theory changed 
 Official approach of low-carbon growth 
- Structural change: establishment of environmental team 
- Procedural changes: analyzing impact of climate change and evaluating methods 
to mitigate climate change; starting to contribute to MDGs by its basic activities  
4.1. The IMF’s Governance Structure  
The member countries of the IMF are represented on the board of governors and the executive 
board. The board of governors is the highest decision-making body of the IMF (see for the governance 
structure of the IMF, [100]). It consists of one governor and one alternate governor for each member 
country. Usually, the governor is the minister of finance or the governor of the central bank. While the 
board of governors has delegated most of its powers to the IMF’s executive board, it retains several 
rights, among others the right to make amendments to the IMF’s articles of agreement. In regard to the 
issue of the environment, the executive board that is responsible for conducting the Fund’s day-to-day 
business was an important actor. The executive board is composed of 24 directors, who are appointed 
or elected by member countries or by groups of countries, and the managing director, who serves as 
the board’s chairman. In addition, the managing director is the head of the IMF staff. The IMF’s 
administration includes several functional departments. Regarding the issue of the environment, the 
external relations department and the fiscal affairs department are relevant organizational units.  
Adm. Sci. 2013, 3 187 
 
4.2. The IMF’s Turn to the Environment (1990–1995)  
During the first period (1990–1995), the espoused theory of the IMF’s bureaucracy changed with 
regard to the member states’ demand to address environmental issues. The concept of a “high-quality 
growth”—that embraces the idea of sustainable development—was developed and gained acceptance 
at the administrative level as the staff recognized that environmental degradation might threaten 
economic growth ([65], p. 1; [101], p. 247; [102], p. 1). The staff started to integrate environmental 
aspects in the policy dialogue with the member countries and also incorporated environmental 
measures in the IMF’s structural adjustment programs. Nevertheless, the staff tried to keep the 
environmental requirement at arm’s length and was only willing to consider environmental aspects 
when they were consistent with the Fund’s basic tasks. It was conducive for integrating the 
environment when a win-win situation seemed to be in reach as it was the case with the IMF’s request 
to cut subsidies for chemicals that harm the environment ([65], p. 7). Next, we will describe this 
process in further detail. 
In 1991, the demand to address environmental issues was formulated by the IMF’s executive board. 
The executive board decided that the IMF “should pay greater attention to environmental issues that 
may have an impact on a country’s macroeconomic stability over time” ([65], p. 3). Thus, it asked the 
IMF’s staff “to study the interaction between macroeconomics and the environment and […] keep 
them in mind when conducting policy dialogues with Fund member countries” ([64], p. vii). 
Therewith, the staff were also recommended to pay attention to major environmental problems of the 
IMF’s member countries [103]. However, the board of governors did not extent the IMF’s mandate 
with regard to environmental protection and warned the IMF not to duplicate the work of the World 
Bank ([65], p. 18). Hence, the executive board decided that environmental issues should be addressed 
“in ways consistent with the IMF’s mandate and the size and structure of the organization” ([65], p. 5). 
To nevertheless achieve environmental objectives, the staff were told to draw upon the expertise of 
other specialized organization, such as the World Bank.  
That the executive board got active on the issue of environmental protection can be partly explained 
with the raising public concern. But most of all, an IMF review from 1990 had shown that national 
environmental problems could “erode trade and budget balances and retard economic growth” ([65], p. 2). 
Hence, the executive board wanted to ensure that the IMF promotes sustainable development and 
avoids recommending policies that could have negative consequences for the environment ([104], p. 23).  
Complying with the executive board’s demand, the IMF’s bureaucracy began to turn towards the 
issue of environmental protection. This process was fostered by Michel Camdessus, the then managing 
director of the IMF (1987–2000). At the beginning of the 1990s, the managing director presented the 
IMF’s concept of ‘high-quality growth’. High-quality growth is described as “growth that is 
sustainable […] and that does not wreak havoc with the atmosphere, with the rivers, forests, or oceans, 
or with any part of mankind’s common heritage” ([65], p. 4). At the UNCED in 1992, the managing 
director referred to high-quality growth as the Fund’s “ultimate objective” ([104], p. 24). Accordingly, 
the staff were instructed to assist member countries with the pursuit of policies oriented towards  
high-quality growth [103].  
The IMF’s high-level staff realized that natural resource degradation threatens growth and the staff 
agreed with the Fund’s first deputy managing director that “[t]aking account of such environmental 
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concerns is just good economics” ([101], p. 247). Thus, the staff started to address environmental 
issues in its policy dialogues with the member countries. Particularly important are the Fund’s 
stabilization and adjustment programs which provide financial support to member countries who 
address macroeconomic imbalances and implement structural reforms ([65], pp. 10–15). The IMF has 
started to incorporate environmental policies in some of these programs. For example, the Fund urged 
the authorities in Ivory Coast to adapt a National Environmental Action Plan and to impose limits on 
timber exports as an element of a revised forest management ([65], p. 14). The developing countries 
were advised to use depletable resources at an optimal rate. In this respect, the IMF pointed to the  
win-win situation for both economy and environment ([102], p. 17; [65], pp. 6–10). Environmental 
measures were included in these and further programs as “structural benchmarks”; the IMF’s financial 
support did not involve environmental conditionality because this had been opposed by many member 
countries ([65]; [103], p. 10, 15). The IMF integrated the results of World Bank studies into its policy 
dialogues with country authorities. In addition, the Fund supported the work on “green accounting” 
which considers the depletion and depreciation of environmental assets and which is carried out by the 
World Bank. 
Despite these activities, the IMF staff raised several objections against the demand to address 
environmental issues. Most of all, they argued that “[w]e are a monetary institution, not an 
environmental one” ([104], p. 23). Thus, a main point was that the Fund’s basic mandate limited its 
work on the environment ([105], p. 271). The staff explained that they could integrate the environment 
into the IMF’s policy dialogue “only to the extent that member countries allow it to do so” and that 
they could only encourage country authorities to adopt appropriate environmental policies ([65], p. 18). 
The director of the fiscal affairs department pointed to the fact that the countries on the executive 
board did not wish the staff “to get deeply involved in the environment” ([105], p. 243) and that they 
opposed an environmental conditionality. Also, the staff emphasized to be “a servant of the member 
countries” ([106], p. 268). Thus, they were not willing to expand their own competences. This can be 
illustrated by the staff’s resistance to the establishment of new environmental structures [103]. The 
staff seemed to regard the new demand as an additional burden that could “dilute its efforts in the area 
of its primary mandate” ([104], p. 24). Particularly, the administration criticized the vague definition of 
sustainable development and complained that “today you [external observers] come with the 
environment, tomorrow you might come with the right of women, the next week with the aged […]. In 
other words, where to draw the line?” ([107], p. 104). Nevertheless, the director of the fiscal affairs 
department added that “there are certain things in the environment that we can do […] without having 
to go the IMF board or changing the mandate of the Fund” ([105], p. 271). For example, the IMF 
thought about suggesting economies in transition to adjust their energy prices; a measure that was 
expected to reduce atmospheric emissions of sulphur ([101], p. 250). 
Furthermore, the staff maintained that environmental objectives were not in line with the Fund’s 
basic mandate because of different timeframes: while the timeframe for the IMF’s work is short term, 
environmental problems tend to be long term ([104], p. 23). Last but not least, the bureaucracy pointed 
to the authority and expertise of the World Bank and other international organizations. Faced with the 
complex and multidisciplinary character of the environment, the staff pointed to their lack of expertise. 
It was invoked that the World Bank was better equipped to deal with such problems and that the IMF 
should not duplicate the Bank’s work on the issue ([101], p. 250; [65], p. 6; [104], p. 24). Even though 
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the US Congress supported the creation of an environmental analysis unit in the IMF ([73], p. 307), 
structural changes did not take place. Further, it was feared that the reduction of staff could affect the 
IMF’s work on the environment ([105], p. 272).  
4.3. Addressing Environmental Issues Within the IMF’s Policy Dialogues (1996–2000)  
Also in the second period (1996–2000), the reaction of the IMF to the demand to address 
environmental issues qualifies as single-loop learning. The staff continued to slightly incorporate 
environmental measures in its policy dialogues. However, they did not regard environmental 
protection as a value in itself but used environmental arguments as an additional justification to defend 
the measures the IMF requested from its member countries. Furthermore, several IMF adjustment 
programs that contained forest sector reforms proved that the Fund’s fundamental principals have 
remained unchanged—the rather vague idea of a ‘high-quality growth’ has not been implemented. 
Thus, the Fund’s theory-in-use did not seem to have changed. We will shed some more light on this 
development in the following. 
Between 1996 and 2000, the IMF continued to incorporate environmental policies within its policy 
dialogue with developing countries. The IMF emphasized that its mandate “is limited to situations where 
environmental problems have a bearing on macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth” ([105], p. 272). 
Thus, the advice the IMF gave in the context of its stabilization and adjustment programs had been 
developed in close cooperation with the World Bank [108]. Because the IMF had realized that market 
prices do not always take adequate account of the environmental impact of an economic activity, the 
Fund argued for adjustments in its policy dialogues. Hence, many stabilization programs included 
increases in energy exercises. The IMF admitted that these increases “may not have been motivated 
primarily by environmental considerations”, but “their consistency with environmental objectives has 
often been seen as an additional important justification” [108]. 
A better management of the environment was, for example, a part of the IMF’s stabilization 
program in Indonesia. Here, the Fund supported measures to undertake consultation on forestry issues. 
Throughout the 1990s, the IMF consistently argued that Fund-supported policy reforms benefitted  
the environment as they had tended to promote a more efficient use of resources in developing 
countries ([65], p. 2; [108]).  
However, critics hold different views. On the one hand, environmental NGOs indeed honored the 
IMF’s acknowledgement of the environmental dimension of its operations as “an important step 
forward” ([109], p. 6) and praised the IMF for having “paid closer attention to environmental issues, 
such as deforestation” ([110], p. 26). On the other hand, they accused the IMF of contributing to 
environmental degradation in the developing world through its unsustainable short-term economic 
development programs [111]; especially with regard to deforestation. Thus, NGOs claimed that the 
IMF’s loans and policies with their foci on export-oriented growth caused deforestation in member 
countries like Indonesia ([109–112]; [113], pp. 213–220). The research results published by  
Vreeland et al. ([110], p. 26) indicate that “on average” IMF programs contributed to deforestation. 
Also with regard to deforestation in developing countries, Mainhardt’s study ([109], p. 4) comes to the 
conclusion that “no matter how eloquently the IMF emphasizes the necessity of ‘high-quality growth’ 
Adm. Sci. 2013, 3 190 
 
and ‘policies that protect the environment’, the fundamental operating principles and conventional 
policies of the IMF remain unchained”.  
Similarly, also the chief of the environmental economics unit of the UN Environmental Programme 
had criticized the design of the IMF’s and the World Bank’s structural adjustment programs because it 
“failed to take account of environmental and social considerations in any meaningful way” ([114], p. 217). 
In addition, NGOs deplored that funding for environmental programs had been hampered by the cuts 
in government spending imposed by the IMF. Because of the negative impact on the environment in 
developing countries, NGOs demanded that IMF initiatives should be coupled with environmental 
safeguards. Further, the IMF was asked to conduct environmental assessments of all loans, grants, and 
strategies ([112], p. 19; [109], p. 6).  
However, the IMF was still not willing to extend its environmental expertise. Even though external 
experts had advised the IMF to acquire environmental skills (“It has already happened in the World 
Bank […]. I see no particular reason why there should be a serious obstacle to the acquisition of 
environmental skills by the Fund staff” ([106], p. 253), the IMF continued to ignore these demands and 
pointed to the close cooperation with the World Bank. The IMF’s attitude towards NGOs that required 
the Fund to practice and promote greater participation of civil society at all levels of activity ([112], p. 19) 
seemed to be ambiguous. On the one hand, the IMF praised the exchange of ideas with environmental 
NGOs as it had benefitted from their “analytical work” especially with respect to the environmental 
implications of the IMF’s stabilization and adjustment programs ([65]; [103], p. 17). On the other 
hand, the IMF staff did not seem to regard themselves as the correct addressee for the 
environmentalists’ concerns: “my request to the NGOs is to please go back to the countries you deal 
with, make sure that the environmental ministers and the economic ministers meet, and ask them to 
bring the Bretton Woods institutions in the same room while they talk” ([106], p. 268). 
4.4. Climate Change as a New Challenge for the IMF (2001–2012)  
The third period starts with a structural change that indicates single-loop learning. In 2001, the IMF 
set up an environmental team—composed of staff from its fiscal affairs department—to “act as a 
resource for the IMF’s area departments” ([115], p. 356). The task of the environmental team is to 
track the issues that arise in IMF consultations with the member states. Thus, it develops country 
environmental fact sheets to identify the links between the macroeconomy and the environment in 
these countries. Therewith, the environmental team wants to make sure that the IMF country desks 
understand the links between IMF programs and the environmental situation in the particular  
countries ([115], p. 356). The environmental team also addresses how the IMF seeks to promote 
sustainable development in its fiscal policy advice. For example, the environmental team argues that 
“in relation to the environment and natural resources, tax and spending policies have a role in 
correcting what would otherwise be inappropriate incentives for overconsumption” ([116], p. 6). Thus, 
the environmental team looks for mechanisms to avoid that the IMF-supported reform programs 
intensify resource degradation in the member countries. The team endorses the use of environmental 
taxes ([115], p. 356) and suggests that subsidies and tax policies that “lead to the excessive 
exploitation of natural resources should be phased out” ([116], p. 27).  
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In 2001, due to more frequent and more destructive weather events, the environmental team and 
other IMF area departments have started to focus on the macroeconomic implications of climate 
change ([115], p. 354). This was justified with the IMF’s role in crisis prevention and management. 
Several IMF departments published policy documents on climate-related public spending and the  
(dis)-advantages of fiscal instruments like emission taxes and cap-and-trade systems to promote 
greener growth [117–122]. A recent IMF report on energy subsidy reform was welcomed by the World 
Wide Fund for Nature [123], because it “shines much light on the dark side of fossil fuel subsidies” 
that cause carbon pollution. The report shows that global fossil fuel subsidies are much higher than 
estimated and that almost half of fossil fuel subsidies occur in OECD countries. 
In addition, the IMF’s efforts on environmental and climate protection were reinforced by the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adapted by the international community at the UN 
Millennium Summit in September 2000. The MDGs are a set of development targets which center on 
halving poverty and improving the welfare of the world’s poorest [120], (see for a critical assessment, [124]). 
One of the eight goals to be achieved by 2015 is to ensure environmental sustainability by integrating 
the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of 
environmental resources. The MDGs—and explicitly the aim of environmental sustainability—were 
supported by the then managing director of the IMF, Horst Köhler (2000–2004). Köhler [125] declared 
that the IMF is “committed to playing an active role in this effort, reflecting its specific mandate and 
expertise.” Currently, the IMF wants to contribute to the MDGs by, among others, “its advice, 
technical assistance and lending to countries” [120].  
With regard to the MDGs, both the IMF managing director and World Bank president emphasize 
the relevance of a sustainable growth and the need to integrate environmental sustainability into core 
development work. The IMF recognized that climate change is “a major threat to sustainable 
development” and to the achievement of the MDGs [126]. Thus, both the IMF and the World Bank 
argue that global warming “necessitates an increased emphasis on integration of climate change 
prevention in development strategies” ([127], p. 10). To combat climate change effectively, the IMF 
and the World Bank argue in favor of a low-carbon growth and developed new strategies like the 
Clean Energy Investment framework ([127], p. 17).  
However, the global monitoring report of 2010 published by the IMF and the Word Bank detected 
that progress on the broader environmental agenda was rather slow ([128], p. 18). Thus, an agenda was 
set up to accelerating progress towards the MDGs. Since then, a sound resource management is 
regarded as critical for sustainable growth in natural resource-dependent countries. In view of mitigation 
of carbon emissions, a financing and technology transfer to developing countries is seen as essential [120]. 
However, Gutner is skeptical in this regard as she observes that the IMF’s response to the MDGs is a 
“marginal adaptation rather than a significant deviation form its usual approach” ([124], p. 285). 
The current IMF managing director Christine Lagarde continues—at least rhetorically—the 
environmental protection efforts of her predecessors. At the UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development in 2012 (Rio+20) Lagarde [129] pointed to the fact that “the IMF is not an 
environmental organization”. Nevertheless, she made clear that “the extensive human suffering and the 
misallocation of resources that leads us down the wrong path” cannot be ignored. To solve the current 
economic, environmental and social crisis, the managing director recommended “getting the green 
economy right.” This means to use fiscal policy to “make sure that the harm we do is reflected in the 
Adm. Sci. 2013, 3 192 
 
prices we pay,” with regard to developing countries, Lagarde noted that “a push to greener investment” 
can lead to “higher growth and greener growth, the best of both worlds” [129]. Thus, it seems that the 
IMF’s theory-in-use did not change: further on, the IMF seems to be only in favor of environmental 
protection measures provided that this is a win-win situation for both environment and economy. 
Otherwise, the IMF tries to keep environmental requirements at arm’s length and keeps pointing to the 
fact that environmental protection is not part of its mandate. 
5. Conclusions  
In the discipline of International Relations, several studies deal with the World Bank’s efforts 
concerning environmental integration. Some of them come to the conclusion that the World Bank 
integrates environmental aspects on a mere superficial level which is therefore seen as greenwashing 
or organizational hypocrisy ([130], pp. 19–43) instead of greening ([67], p. 538; [69], p. 17).  
We introduced a concept of organizational learning (see Table 1) that is capable of scrutinizing the 
quality of environmental integration. It differentiates at a first level learning and non-learning 
according to changes of organizational knowledge and compliant vs. non-compliant learning at a 
second level. Compliant learning, however, can be of different quality; therefore single-loop learning 
can be separated from double-loop learning at a third level whereas non-compliant learning is 
conceptualized as double-loop learning. Finally, at the fourth level, the quality of organizational 
learning (single- vs. double-loop learning) can be derived from an organization’s theories of action, 
i.e., its espoused theory and theory-in-use. 
Organizational learning is a dynamic process that takes time to develop [12]. Thus, our analysis of 
environmental integration in the administrations of the World Bank and the IMF covered the 
timeframes from 1970–2012 and 1990–2012. Due to our interest in the quality of organizational 
changes, we analyzed on the basis of an illustrative case study if the bureaucracies’ reactions towards 
the external demands to integrate environmental aspects into their activities qualify as single-loop 
learning or as double-loop learning. While the World Bank’s administration implemented 
environmental protection requirements more seriously in the recent past—the example of the revision 
of its safeguard policies indicates double-loop learning—the IMF has fallen behind as we only identify 
single-loop learning in all three time-periods (see for an overview Tables 2 and 3). However, we would 
not agree that the IMF is only greenwashing whereas the World Bank has greened because both 
organizations have started to implement environmental concerns and therefore learned as their 
organizational knowledge has changed towards environmental integration. Contrary to the more 
comprehensive efforts of the World Bank, environmental integration takes place only at the level of 
the IMF’s espoused theory. Nevertheless, the IMF moved towards environmental integration—albeit 
in a single-loop manner. Furthermore, the case of the World Bank proved that after a long phase of 
single-loop learning, an organization can even change its underlying assumptions that qualify as 
double-loop learning.  
According to our theoretical model, we would not identify organizational hypocrisy even if both 
organizations do not fully implement environmental protection requirements. However, we can 
identify if and to what extent international organizations follow external demands. They can ignore an 
external demand (non-learning), follow it on a rather superficially level (single-loop learning), they 
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can profoundly implement an external demand (double-loop learning) or they can even refuse to 
follow an external demand by reinforcing the importance of their existing theories of action  
(non-compliant double-loop learning). Furthermore, we would not conclude that implementation on a 
superficial level (that might be seen as organizational hypocrisy) leads to a hypocrisy trap. On the 
contrary—as the case of the World Bank shows—periods of single-loop learning can be followed by 
double-loop learning, too. However, even if we identify compliant double-loop learning as in the case 
of the World Bank, this does not imply that the World Bank is turning into an environmental 
organization. Rather, it means that the organization is able to question its core beliefs and underlying 
assumptions concerning challenging external demands. 
Discussing the difficulties with reforming the World Bank, scholars detected several important 
factors that also seem to have influenced the Bank’s organizational learning process; especially its 
organizational culture ([2], p. 427; [74], p. 131; [86], p. 495; [87], p. 122;), bureaucratic resistance and 
administrative autonomy ([1], p. 242; [2], p. 420; [3], p. 34; [76], p. 237; [131]), lacking interests of 
member states and, thus, lacking resources to implement reforms ([2], p. 427; [37], p. 267; [86], p. 495). We 
would like to add that also lacking or ineffective monitoring systems may inhibit organizational 
learning—as the case of the IMF seems to show—while existing and stringent monitoring systems 
may positively affect the learning of administrations (cf., [3], p. 29; [37], p, 278). As our case study of 
the World Bank demonstrates, its monitoring system—induced by the member states—was vital for its 
increasing learning curve. Especially the establishment of the inspection panel and its complaint 
mechanism allow detecting whether the Bank’s projects in developing countries harm the 
environment. Furthermore, the fact that the independent evaluation group started to monitor the 
activities of the administration in terms of environmental protection was essential for a better 
environmental performance. Thus, the evaluation group can be considered an important trigger for 
organizational learning of the World Bank’s bureaucracy (cf., [74], p. 127). Even though an 
independent evaluation office (IEO) was set up in 2001 to conduct evaluations of the Fund’s policies 
and activities, the IEO was not made responsible for the environment, which might be one explanation 
among others for IMF’s lesser performance.  
Concerning single-loop and double-loop learning within the Bretton Woods institutions, further 
empirical analysis is necessary to give more insights on the World Bank’s efforts to revise its 
safeguard policies and the IMF’s contribution to the implementation of the Millennium Development 
Goals. Further textual analyses and interviews in the World Bank and the IMF could be carried out to 
examine how both organizations operate internally, and how they implemented environmental 
concerns step by step. 
A caveat needs to be issued concerning non-compliant learning. Conceptually, we expect that 
(international) organizations might also learn in a non-compliant fashion. However, both the World 
Bank and the IMF did not resist the external demands and did not claim that, e.g., their economic 
orientations and activities should remain untouched, because they are convinced of the relevance of 
their theories of action and because they regard environmental integration as an obstacle for their 
organizational goals. We assume that non-compliant learning could be observed in particular in the 
beginning of a policy implementation process if external pressure is rather low or if principals are 
unable to force international organizations to implement external demands. In our case studies we 
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might find non-compliant learning if we further differentiate the administration into units and analyze 
organizational learning at the unit level.  
Our contribution aims at narrowing the gap between international organizations and organization 
studies as it shows how organizational learning can be applied to international organizations. The 
theoretical and empirical value of this endeavor can be observed from the introduced concept of 
organizational learning and the two case studies. Further empirical research on organizational learning 
in international organizations could help to scrutinize the conditions and circumstances for 
organizational learning in general and the transition between learning types in particular. 
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